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A MORE JUST SYSTEM OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: CREATING A NEW STANDARD 
OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JUVENILES IN 
ILLINOIS 
BROOKE TROUTMAN* 
For over a century, America’s legal system has made substantial 
reforms to change its treatment of adolescents.  Every day, we see that our 
legal system treats adolescents differently from their adult counterparts.  
With regards to driving privileges, voting rights, and the ability to drink, our 
laws recognize that adults and adolescents are different and therefore 
require a different set of standards.  America extended this treatment to the 
realm of juvenile justice in 1899, when Cook County, Illinois, created the 
country’s first juvenile court.  Originating in this court was the overarching 
purpose of America’s juvenile justice system—rehabilitation of juvenile 
offenders. 
Though over a century has passed since the creation of America’s first 
juvenile court, only recently has the law begun to treat juveniles differently 
from their adult counterparts.  In the past decade, landmark Supreme Court 
decisions Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
and Miller v. Alabama have implemented constitutional shields for juveniles 
against the death penalty, life without parole, and improper Miranda 
waivers.  In implementing these safeguards, the Supreme Court has employed 
new scientific understandings of juveniles, as well as common sense, to 
conclude that juveniles are different from adults and should be treated 
differently by the law. 
Though the Supreme Court created safeguards for juveniles in death 
penalty and life without parole circumstances, situations still exist that 
 
* B.A., Northwestern University, 2015; J.D. candidate, Northwestern University Pritzker 
School of Law, 2018. This Comment could not have been completed without the guidance and 
support of Professors Maria Hawilo and Thomas Geraghty of Northwestern Pritzker School 
of Law. I also wish to thank Megan Richard, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, class of 
2018, for her invaluable assistance. 
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threaten the lives of juvenile offenders.  Illinois accountability theory is one 
such situation.  In Illinois, accountability theory is the mechanism by which 
the State can convict an offender of a crime which they did not actually 
commit.  In Illinois, an individual who exhibited more than “mere presence” 
at the scene of the crime can be convicted of the same crime and sentenced 
in the same manner as the individual who committed the crime.  Given the 
recent landmark Supreme Court cases, new scientific findings relating to the 
psychological understanding of juveniles, as well as simple common sense, 
accountability theory should not be used to prosecute juvenile offenders in 
Illinois.1 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is not a new or innovative concept to say that juveniles are different 
from adults in a legal sense or even in common sense.2  William Blackstone, 
the architect of common law, built his theory of criminal justice upon the 
foundation that only two types of people were incapable of committing 
crimes—those that were insane and those that were considered “infants.”3  
Though in the present day, an infant may be defined as someone who is a 
baby or a young child in the most basic stage of life, Blackstone’s definition 
 
1  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 
264–65 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
551 (2005).  
2  ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, DIALOGUE ON YOUTH AND JUSTICE 4 (2007).  
3  See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22; Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone 
as Architect: Constructing the Commentaries, 15 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 103 (2003).  
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was far wider reaching.4  Blackstone believed that “infants,” a category of 
people not capable of committing crimes, encompassed all young people 
possessing a “defect of the understanding.”5  The United States internalized 
this concept and expounded upon it through its legal system, establishing a 
separate criminal justice system altogether for juveniles.6  In 1899, Cook 
County in Illinois created the country’s first juvenile court, catalyzing a trend 
that spread to almost every state in less than three decades.7  With this 
movement to separate juvenile criminal justice from adult criminal justice 
came an understanding that juveniles deserved different treatment in criminal 
law than their adult counterparts.8  As such, juvenile courts across America 
adopted rehabilitation as their primary purpose.9  This goal diverged from the 
punitive goals that characterize the adult criminal justice system.10 
This rehabilitative treatment of young offenders has remained a 
component of the juvenile criminal justice system.  However, in recent years, 
the Supreme Court has made a substantial effort to expand upon this, carving 
out distinct protections for juveniles.11  In the past ten years, the Court has 
ruled that it is unconstitutional to subject juveniles to the death penalty, that 
juveniles deserve individualized consideration in life without parole 
sentences, and that a juvenile’s age must be taken into consideration when 
analyzing Miranda waivers.12  The Supreme Court has acknowledged, 
through these legal advancements, that a new body of psychological and 
physiological science has changed what we know about adolescents, the 
adolescent brain, and adolescent development—mainly that the brain is still 
developing in its adolescent years in many key areas that impact decision-
making skills and foreseeability.13 
While the Supreme Court has taken a multitude of steps to expand the 
 
4  BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *22. 
5  Id.  
6  ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 5. 
7  Id.  
8  See id.  
9  Samantha Buckingham, Trauma Informed Juvenile Justice, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 
666–67 (2016).  
10  Id.  
11  Among those protections are protection from life without parole punishments, 
protections from the identical analysis of Miranda waivers that pertain to adults, and the 
protection from the death penalty.  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264–65 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
12  Miller, 567 U.S. at 465; J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 264–65; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 
543 U.S. at 578–79.   
13  Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 n.5.  
TROUTMAN 1/25/18  11:24 AM 
200 Troutman [Vol. 108 
rights and protections of juveniles, courts in the state of Illinois have taken 
similar steps to substantially develop and expand the State’s law of 
accountability.14  Though the Supreme Court’s developments in the areas of 
juvenile law are reasonably viewed as progressive in their protection of 
juveniles, changes in Illinois accountability law are increasingly expansive 
and  broaden the reach of accountability law.15  In Illinois, accountability law 
is not a separate crime but rather a method courts use to prosecute individuals 
when the individual was not the primary actor but provided some semblance 
of assistance.16  Juveniles have not been so lucky to escape the grasp of this 
extraordinarily powerful law and are prosecuted in an identical manner as 
their adult counterparts.17  While the law has changed in many areas to 
adeptly recognize the new psychological and physiological findings about 
young people, accountability law in Illinois remains a substantial challenge 
to overcome for juvenile offenders.18 
This Comment argues that a new standard should be used to analyze the 
culpability of juveniles adjudicated under the Illinois accountability statute.19  
Part I.A begins with a brief survey of juvenile law in the United States.  Then 
Part I.B highlights the recent advancements in science and psychology 
pertaining to adolescent brain development that were essential for the success 
of the aforementioned cases.  This is followed in Part I. C by an in-depth 
analysis of the recent Supreme Court cases that have effectively established 
different standards and new protections for juveniles during the Miranda 
process and sentencing.  Next, Part I. D presents the Illinois accountability 
law as it stands today, illustrating the history and purpose of accountability 
law and acknowledging the recent case law that has interpreted the statute 
expansively, leading to its wide reach.  Finally, Part II argues that the same 
reasoning and understanding that the Supreme Court used to bolster its 
holdings in these recent landmark decisions surrounding juveniles should be 
used to inform an analysis of juvenile accountability in Illinois. 
 
14  Michael G. Heyman, Clinging to the Common Law in an Age of Statutes: Criminal Law 
in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 29, 33–34 (2014).  
15  Id.  
16  Id. 
17  See Michael G. Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law of 
Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2013).  
18  Id.  
19  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5–2 (West 2017) (establishing when accountability exists in 
crimes).  
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I.  WHY THIS PROBLEM EXISTS 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The first pronounced element of America’s juvenile justice system 
emerged through specialized institutions for juveniles, mainly those 
convicted of truancy in large urban areas.20  These facilities, such as the 
Society for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency and the Chicago Reform 
School, were built upon the foundation of rehabilitating youth and separating 
youth from adult offenders.21  In 1899, after 575 Chicago children were 
convicted of various offenses within Cook County, Illinois was propelled to 
establish a system of juvenile courts to adjudicate the children.22  These 
courts did not serve a penal purpose.23  In fact, the juvenile court’s first chief 
probation officer explained, “[i]nstead of reformation, the thought and idea 
in the judge’s mind should always be formation . . .  and [the child] certainly 
cannot be reformed by punishing him.”24  Within twenty-five years, almost 
every state in America had created a similar institution with similar 
rehabilitative goals.25  During that time, Illinois remained steadfast in its 
dedication to the reformation of young offenders.26  As Judge Julian Mack, 
one of the first judges to preside over the juvenile court in Cook County, 
explained, “[t]he child who must be brought into court should . . . be made to 
feel that he is the object of [the state’s] care and solicitude.”27  Thus, in its 
early years, the Illinois juvenile justice system sought to nurture and reform 
the juvenile offenders that found their way into its grasp. 
Case law that emerged in the following century echoed the treatment of 
juveniles shown in the juvenile courts and sought to codify the appropriate 
treatment of juveniles in the law.28  In 1984 in Clay v. State, three boys, all 
under the age of sixteen, were charged and convicted of first degree murder.29  
Though Florida’s Supreme Court upheld the convictions, the court cautioned 
that all children under the age of seven possessed a conclusive presumption 
 
20  ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 5; see generally William W. 
Booth, History and Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, in FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND 
PRACTICE (The Florida Bar ed., 13th ed. 2013).  
21  ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 5.  
22  Booth, supra note 20, at § 1.6 (2013).  
23  David S. Tanenhaus, First Things First: Juvenile Justice Reform in Historical Context, 
46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 282 (2013). 
24  Id.  
25  ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 5. 
26  Id.  
27  Id.  
28  People v. Olsen, 36 Cal. 3d 638, 649 (1984); Clay v. State, 143 Fla. 204, 207 (1940). 
29  143 Fla. at 207.  
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of innocence.30  This meant that a child under the age of seven could not be 
found culpable regardless of the information provided by the prosecution.31  
In 1984, the California Supreme Court further extended this presumption of 
innocence in People v. Olsen, where the defendant allegedly raped a 
fourteen-year-old and tried to use a mistake-of-age defense to avoid a 
statutory rape conviction.32  According to Olsen, criminal law maintains that 
all children between seven and fourteen have a rebuttable presumption of 
incapacity.33  Though this presumption may be overcome, the burden to do 
so rests entirely with the prosecution.34  In the same year that Olsen was 
decided, a sixteen-year-old in Oklahoma received the death penalty for 
murdering a police officer.35  In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke 
generally about the “condition” of youth rather than the specific implications 
of a certain age.  The Court explained that youth is more than a 
“chronological fact” and creates a “condition of life when a person may be 
most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”36  Thus, Olsen 
opened the door for the Court to utilize age as a tool for reasoning in its 
holdings. 
In 1988, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court began using 
dicta from these previous cases to expand upon the rights and privileges of 
juveniles.37  In Thompson, the Supreme Court overturned a fifteen-year-old’s 
death sentence.38  Though the Court upheld the child’s conviction of first 
degree murder, the Court determined that a death sentence was inappropriate 
for Thompson.39  The Court determined that the likelihood that a teenage 
offender has made the kind of “cold blooded,” “cost-benefit analysis that 
attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be 
virtually nonexistent,” making a juvenile’s “irresponsible conduct . . . not as 
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”40  In 1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 
 
30  Id. at 208.  
31  Id.  
32  36 Cal. 3d at 649. 
33  Id. at 647.  “Incapacity” in this sense means incapable of committing a crime.  Because 
children aged seven to fourteen have a rebuttable presumption of incapacity, they are not 
always incapable of committing a crime.  However, the term “rebuttable” means that the court 
begins by assuming the child is not capable of committing the crime and it then falls on the 
prosecution to present evidence to show why the child acted atypically.   
34  Id. at 651.  
35  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105–06 (1982). 
36  Id. at 115.   
37  487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
38  Id. at 816.  
39  Id. 
40  Id. at 835, 837–38.  
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an opinion by Justice Brennan recognized that juveniles are generally less 
criminally responsible for their actions than their adult counterparts.41  
However, though the Thompson Court held the sentence inappropriate for its 
teenage offender, the Court did not yet extend this assumption to provide a 
categorical ban on implementing the death penalty for all juvenile 
offenders.42  Juveniles would need to wait fifteen years for the Court to 
provide that guarantee.43 
B. JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS: A SCIENTIFIC 
APPROACH 
Following Stanford, a great deal of scientific research helped establish 
that adults and adolescents differ in critical physical, mental, and emotional 
abilities.44  For adolescents, these differences create obstacles in evaluating 
the long-term effects of actions, thereby making it more likely that 
adolescents will make poor decisions.45  Recent advances in Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (“MRI”) and psychological research have focused on the 
frontal lobes of the adolescent brain.46  Such research has found that the 
frontal lobe, which is responsible for planning and implementing behaviors 
that are goal-directed, is the last portion of the brain to mature during 
adolescence.47  Because adolescents do not have the full capacity of their 
frontal lobe, this underdevelopment leads to challenges in decision-making, 
foresight, strategic thinking, and risk management.48 
It has been shown that the frontal lobe is divided into two systems: the 
prefrontal cortex and the limbic system.49  The prefrontal cortex controls 
 
41  See 492 U.S. 361, 377–78 (1989).  
42  Id.  
43  The death penalty was abolished for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005).  
44  Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the 
Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 114 (2013) (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth 
Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication 
of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 389, 391 (1999)).  
45  Daniel Romer, Adolescent Risk Taking, Impulsivity, and Brain Development: 
Implication for Prevention, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 263, 263 (2010).  
46  See ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED 
MIND 23 (2001).  
47  See Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During 
Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8177 (2004). 
48  See id.; Antonio R. Damasio & Steven W. Anderson, The Frontal Lobes, in CLINICAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 404, 434 (Kenneth M. Heilman & Edward Valenstein eds., 4th ed. 2003); 
M.-Marsel Mesulam, Behavioral Neuroanatomy, in PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIORAL AND 
COGNITIVE NEUROLOGY 1, 47–48 (M.-Marsel Mesulam ed., 2d ed. 2000).  
49  See GOLDBERG, supra note 46, at 23.  
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reasoning, planning, and impulsivity, while the limbic system controls 
instinctual behavior such as the fight-or-flight response.50  Though these two 
systems are balanced in a normal adult brain, such that reasoning abilities are 
balanced with instinctual abilities, they are out of balance during the 
developmental and growth stages of adolescence.51  The reason is that the 
development of these two systems occurs at different rates.52  The limbic 
system matures faster than the prefrontal cortex, which creates a high level 
of instinctual behavior and leaves reasoning and planning for the final stages 
in development.53  This imbalance creates emotionality and vulnerability, 
causing teenagers to more heavily rely on the instinctual cues provided by 
the limbic system than on rationality and reason provided by the prefrontal 
cortex.54  As a result, these instinctual drives stimulate teenagers to “seek 
higher levels of novelty and to take more risks.”55 
The development of the adolescent brain causes juveniles to act 
“impulsively and without full appreciation of the consequences” because 
they possess a very limited amount of self-control.56  As adolescents grow 
and mature, their cognitive abilities begin to rise to the level of adults; 
however, during the time of growth, they do not have an ability to assess risks 
and make decisions like a reasonable adult.57  This inability to assess risks 
results in a “willingness to take physical, social, legal, and financial risks . . . 
for the sake of such experiences.”58 
This inherent risk-taking behavior, manifested in immature judgment, 
also reveals a decreased sense of foreseeability that provides an additional 
challenge to adolescent decision-making.59  First, adolescents have a 
diminished ability to foresee consequences because they lack the experience 
that is necessary to properly anticipate the consequences of their actions.60  
Therefore, adolescents do not base their decisions on consequences they can 
anticipate based on experience, but based on the instinctual feelings 
 
50  Id.   
51  Kevin Saunders, The Role of Science in the Supreme Court’s Limitations on Juvenile 
Punishment, TEX. TECH L. REV. 339, 351 (2013).   
52  Id.  
53  Id.  
54  Id.  
55  Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 822 
(2003).  
56  Feld, supra note 44, at 109.  
57  Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 813.  
58  See MARVIN ZUCKERMAN, BEHAVIORAL EXPRESSIONS AND BIOSOCIAL BASES OF 
SENSATION SEEKING 27 (1994).  
59  See Mesulam, supra note 48, at 47–48. 
60  Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 813–14. 
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stemming from the limbic system.61 
In addition to this lack of experience, adolescents are less efficient at 
processing information.  Therefore, when they are calculating potential 
consequences of an action, adolescents are unable to quickly determine 
foreseeable consequences and then make a rational decision based upon those 
consequences.62  Thus, adolescents make quick decisions that are impulsive 
and less reliable when compared to adults.63  Furthermore, adolescents 
generally are less future-oriented in their thinking than adults.  This makes 
adolescents less likely to even weigh the consequences of their actions in the 
first place.64  Because children and teenagers tend to think short term, they 
may not think “realistically about what may occur” as a result of their 
actions.65 
Adolescents simply cannot weigh the costs and benefits of an action in 
a way that reasonable adults can.66  While juveniles may be capable of 
making rational decisions in a calm and patient setting, a stressful 
environment dramatically compromises their ability to make those same 
thoughtful decisions.67  Furthermore, even though adolescents may be able to 
cursorily weigh consequences and benefits in stressful situations, they do so 
in a way that is much different than adults.68  Adolescents strongly overvalue 
the gains from impulsivity, enjoyment, and peer approval.69  Conversely, they 
undervalue the true consequences and potential for loss due to their inability 
to foresee the comprehensive and long-term consequences.70 
While it is challenging for adolescents to make quick and rational 
decisions, they also have a psychological disposition towards certain 
sensation-seeking characteristics that cause adolescents “to undertake risky 
behaviors.”71  Compared with individuals at other ages and stages of 
 
61  Id.  
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in 
the Wake of Roper, Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 313 (2012).  
66  Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on 
Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 271, 273 (Thomas 
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000). 
67  Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on 
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1782 (1995).  
68  See LAURENCE STEINBERG, ADOLESCENCE 88 (6th ed. 2002). 
69  Id.   
70  Id.  
71  ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., KIDS ARE DIFFERENT: HOW KNOWLEDGE OF 
ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT THEORY CAN AID DECISION-MAKING IN COURT 8 (2000).  
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development, adolescents “exhibit a disproportionate amount of reckless 
behavior, sensation seeking, and risk taking.”72  This behavior, however, is 
at least in part due to adolescents’ inability to perceive and evaluate the costs 
and benefits of their actions in the same way that adults do.73 
While adolescents attempt to navigate decision-making under a variety 
of inherent obstacles, they are also incredibly vulnerable and susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures.74  Adolescents are uniquely 
vulnerable in peer pressure situations because they have less independence 
and experience with controlling their own environment, and thus are more 
likely to follow the actions of others.75  This vulnerability stems from an 
inability to manage behavior in the “face of pressure from others to violate 
the law, or to extricate oneself from a potentially problematic situation.”76  
The challenges adolescents face in removing themselves from problematic or 
dangerous circumstances result from both a physical inability to direct certain 
behavior and an inability to escape situations.77  In many cases, adolescents 
are physically unable to leave their environment because they cannot move, 
drive, or leave and thus rely on adults to dictate choices that influence their 
environment.78  Additionally, criminal activity is “sometimes rewarded with 
higher status” in groups of teenagers, thus encouraging adolescents to engage 
in such behavior.79  Because youth may value certain social benefits 
differently than adults, they are likely to view approval from peers as 
incredibly valuable and eliciting of increased rewards.80  This value system, 
in tandem with adolescents’ decreased foreseeability, incites them to act for 
the immediate gains offered by peer approval, without proper evaluation of 
the criminal consequences.81 
Though these psychological characteristics characterize the period of 
 
72  L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV 417, 421 (2000). 
73  See Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 
12 DEV. REV. 339, 350–53 (1992).  
74  Spear, supra note 72, at 423 (explaining that the decision-making process of adolescents 
“may be more vulnerable to disruption by the stresses and strains of everyday living”).  
75  Keller, supra note 65, at 314.  
76  Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 44, at 407. 
77  Christopher Slobogin, Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and 
Expanded Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 132 n.161 (2013) (citing 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR 
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 26–27 (2011) (“[E]scape from risk-inducing environments is more 
difficult for dependent children than for adults.”)). 
78  Id.   
79  Keller, supra note 65, at 314.  
80  See ZUCKERMAN, supra note 58, at 27.  
81  Id.  
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adolescence, the transient nature of the adolescent personality marks another 
important hallmark of this period of development.82  Adolescent personalities 
are generally more dynamic because of a greater amount of perceived stress 
and drastic hormonal fluctuations.83  This, in turn, causes teenagers to 
“experience emotional states that are more extreme, more variable, and less 
predictable than those experienced by children or adults.”84  These ranging 
and unpredictable emotions often account for the seemingly irrational 
criminal acts for which many juvenile offenders are adjudicated.85  
Conversely, this same malleable personality, which can be blamed for many 
of the delinquent acts of juvenile offenders, can also be credited as providing 
the potential for positive change.86  Therefore, the actions, criminal or 
otherwise, that occur on one day do not necessarily reflect the permanent 
disposition of the juvenile offender.87  In fact, malleability of the adolescent 
personality makes it far more likely for youth to positively change in a period 
of fewer months or years than it would an adult who committed the same 
crime.88 
Psychological research also provides insight as to the influence of peers 
on brain activity, suggesting that the presence of peers neurologically 
stimulates the reward center of the brain.89  The reward stimulation that 
comes as a result of peer interaction often leads to an increase in risk taking 
and reckless action that tends to ensue with a group of teenagers.90  The sheer 
number of juvenile cases that have co-defendants illustrates this occurrence, 
exemplifying the fact that juveniles are more likely to commit crimes with 
their peers than alone.91  This phenomenon, however, is better explained by 
using psychological research about the adolescent brain as a lens to view 
these crimes.92  Differences in the adolescent brain, both psychologically and 
 
82  Brief for A.B.A. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellant at 11–12, Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412 and 08-7621), 2009 WL 2197339 (citing Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)). 
83  Spear, supra note 72, at 429.  
84  Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 67, at 1782.  
85  See, e.g., Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 
13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115, 117–19 (2007).  
86  Feld, supra note 44, at 148 (citing Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ 
Responses’ to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST.: AN ANN. REV. 189 (1998)).  
87  Id.  
88  Elizabeth Scott et. al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in A Constitutional Framework, 88 
TEMP. L. REV. 675, 679 (2016).  
89  See, e.g., Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing 
Activity in the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14:2 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F2.  
90  Id. at F7.  
91  Id. at F1, F7. 
92  Id.  
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biologically, from the adult brain lead to challenges in decision-making and 
obstacles in resisting peer pressure.93  The normal adolescent brain, simply 
put, has limitations that not only encourage engagement in reckless activities 
but also limit an adolescent’s ability to fight against such impulses.94 
C. JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
APPROACH 
In the past decade, there has been a consistent trend by courts, including 
the Supreme Court, to evaluate juveniles differently than their adult 
counterparts.95  Beginning in 2005, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons 
declared it unconstitutional to sentence juveniles to the death penalty.96  This 
was the case to finally provide a categorical ban on sentencing juveniles to 
death.97  In this case, the Court overturned a seventeen-year-old defendant’s 
death sentence that resulted from a conviction of first-degree murder.98  The 
Supreme Court determined that because a juvenile possessed a degree of 
“diminished culpability,” it rendered a death sentence unconstitutional for 
such an adolescent under the Eighth Amendment.99  In its reasoning, the 
Court synthesized recent scientific findings about adolescent development.100  
Its synthesis established “three general differences between juveniles under 
18 and adults,” which were (1) “a lack of maturity and . . . responsibility . . . 
[that] often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions;” (2) 
increased vulnerability to negative influences and exposure to peer pressure; 
and (3) the distinct “personality traits of juveniles”  which were “more 
transitory” resulting in the malleable personality of a juvenile.101  Roper 
opened the door for a series of Supreme Court decisions that would 
dramatically safeguard the rights of juveniles. 
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that a life without 
parole sentence for non-homicide juvenile offenders was also 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.102  Graham, however, went 
 
93  Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 813; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 44, at 407–
09.  
94  Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 813. 
95  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 
261, 261 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005). 
96  543 U.S. at 568.  
97  Id. at 560. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. at 570–71.  
100 Id. at 569–70. 
101 Id.  
102 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010).  
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one step further than simply providing a categorical ban of life without parole 
sentences for such offenders.103  In its reasoning, the Court affirmatively 
recognized that adolescents are deserving of a “meaningful opportunity” for 
rehabilitation.104  This created the new standard to evaluate juvenile 
sentences: the “meaningful opportunity” standard.105  This standard requires 
sentences to consider time for maturity and rehabilitation, thus a “meaningful 
opportunity.”106 
In 2011, just one year after Graham, the Court in  J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina ruled that a child’s age must be taken into account for the purposes 
of a Miranda analysis.107  This holding effectively relied on Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, where the Court held that a child’s age is “more than a 
chronological fact,”108 in establishing how age “would have affected how a 
reasonable person” in police custody “would perceive his or her freedom to 
leave.”109  In J.D.B., the Court’s explanation of a child’s perception during 
the Miranda process also relied upon the common understanding of children 
acknowledged in Graham as well as social science and cognitive science.110 
In 2011, Miller v. Alabama extended the ruling in Graham even further, 
holding that mandatory life without the possibility of parole sentences for 
juveniles charged with homicide were unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment of the Constitution.111  The holding in Miller was confirmed and 
expanded in Montgomery v. Louisiana, where the Court’s holding 
determined that the Miller decision applies retroactively to all cases 
nationwide.112  This opened the door for all juveniles previously sentenced to 
life without parole to appeal and possibly receive a lesser sentence that would 
provide the opportunity to spend some portion of their lives outside prison.113 
Analyzing Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and Montgomery in conjunction 
with one another establishes a new body of juvenile law that is premised on 
 
103 Id. at 49.  
104  Id. at 50.  
105  Id.  
106  Id. 
107  564 U.S. 261, 261 (2011). 
108  Id. at 271–72. 
109  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). 
110  J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273 n.5 (“Although citation to social science and cognitive science 
authorities is unnecessary to establish these commonsense propositions, the literature confirms 
what experience bears out.”).  See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (“[D]evelopments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and 
adult minds.”). 
111  560 U.S. 460, 487 (2012). 
112  136 S. Ct. 718, 744 (2016).   
113  Id. at 723. 
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the understanding that juveniles are categorically different from adults.114  
Therefore, in order for courts to treat adolescents effectively and 
constitutionally under the law, courts must take into account the scientific 
and common sense understanding of adolescent behavior.115 
These landmark cases throughout the past decade have established that 
juveniles are not only categorically different from adults but also that the law 
must treat juveniles differently from adults based on these stark 
differences.116  The Supreme Court based this distinction, which is now 
accepted as law, by using “common sense . . . what ‘any parent knows’” and 
by acknowledging advancements in psychology and social science that have 
led to an increased knowledge concerning the brain development of 
adolescents, which further informed our understanding of juvenile 
offenders.117  These landmark cases also show that the Court not only 
acknowledges the advancements, but is willing to take into account new and 
cutting-edge psychological science that explains the difference between 
adults and adolescents if such research creates a more appropriate and just 
legal standard.118  Moreover, the Court has accepted the understanding of the 
plasticity of the adolescent brain as well as the duration of adolescence to 
explain that choices made during that period of development do not 
necessarily reflect a permanent and lasting future of recidivism but rather the 
possibility for rehabilitation and positive change.119  This understanding has 
come to play a key role in the Court’s assessment of the criminal choices 
made by adolescents—both in assessing the level of moral culpability to 
assign to an adolescent who commits a delinquent act and in assessing the 
proportionate consequences that an adolescent should face as a result of such 
a choice.120 
The characteristics of juveniles that the Court has specially noted in 
 
114  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 723; Miller, 560 U.S. at 487; J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 261; 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.  
115  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 723; Miller, 560 U.S. at 487; J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 261; 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
116  Miller, 560 U.S. at 477 (explaining that a judge “misses too much if he treats every 
child as an adult” because the juvenile has such distinct characteristics that distinguish them 
from an adult, “among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences”).  
117  Id. at 470–71 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).  
118  Id. at 472 n.5 (“The evidence presented to us in these cases indicates that the science 
and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even 
stronger.”).  
119  Id. at 472 (explaining that the “rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess 
consequences” are lessened “as the years go by and neurological development occurs so that 
‘deficiencies will be reformed’”) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).  
120  Id.  
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support of its holdings are (1) the immaturity of youth and failure to 
demonstrate mature judgment, (2) the susceptibility of youth to peer pressure, 
and (3) the potential for reform that adolescents exhibit because of the 
developmental phase that characterizes adolescence.121  Together, these 
characteristics create a decision-making process distinctly different from 
adults, inhibited by cognitive differences, psychosocial senses, and 
neurological deficits.122  Delving into these characteristics of juveniles and 
the developmental phase of their brains, the Court has understood that 
juveniles possess a diminished ability to accurately foresee and weigh risks 
and benefits.123  This makes juveniles less adept at envisioning danger 
inherent in their conduct as well as anticipating consequences that are likely 
to result from their activity.124  Therefore, adolescents are less able to discern 
whether the risks associated with their conduct are justified.125 
D. ACCOUNTABILITY LAW: ILLINOIS’S APPROACH 
It has long been established through the foundation of criminal law that 
to be found guilty of a crime, there must have been a showing of actus reus, 
the criminal act, in addition to a showing of mens rea, the criminal mindset.126  
Accountability law side-steps this two-part requirement by resting upon the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine.127  This doctrine allows a court 
to convict a defendant, who did not necessarily commit the end crime, in the 
same manner and magnitude as the court would convict the principal actor, 
the individual who committed the crime in question.128  The doctrine is rooted 
in the premise that individuals should be held responsible if the “subsequent 
crime was a foreseeable consequence of the first, no matter how 
indistinct.”129  In so doing, the doctrine paves the road for the courts to 
convict individuals of a subsequent act or a different individual with only 
 
121  Roper, 542 U.S. at 569–70. 
122  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).  
123  Id.  
124  Id.  
125  Id.  
126  See generally Evan Goldstick, Accidental Vitiation: The Natural and Probable 
Consequence of Rosemond v. United States on the Natural and Probable Consequence 
Doctrine, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (2016). 
127  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5–2 (West 2017); Michael G. Heyman, The Natural and 
Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. 
L. 388, 395 (2010).  
128  Heyman, supra note 127, at 395. 
129  Id. This far-reaching relationship between the first act and the act for which the 
defendant is being convicted is known as the “common design” theory of accountability—the 
design is the path created between the first and last act. Id.  
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minimal regard to the necessary mental intent.130  Essentially, the doctrine of 
natural and probable consequences allows a defendant to be found guilty 
without the necessary mens rea, through another individual’s actus reus.131  
In this way, accountability theory stretches beyond the original requirements 
necessary to prove culpability and widens the net available to convict 
individuals.132  Thus, accountability theory has created an avenue of criminal 
liability which is derived from another’s actions, the principal actor.133  While 
each state has crafted its own definition of accountability through legislation, 
many states have also relied upon case law to interpret the contours of this 
highly subjective area of law.134 
Throughout the country, Illinois has been highlighted for upholding 
convictions that illustrated some of the most liberal and expansive uses of 
accountability theory.135  Though the statute has undergone significant 
change since its inception, the most recent change to the accountability law 
statute in Illinois occurred in 2010,136 enacting the following version of the 
statute which governs Illinois accountability law today: 
§ 5–2. When accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of 
another when: 
(a) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or she causes 
another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal 
incapacity lacks such a mental state; 
(b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her so accountable; or 
(c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote 
or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid 
that other person in the planning or commission of the offense. 
When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts 
in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be 
the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible 
for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does 
 
130  Goldstick, supra note 126, at 1310.  
131  Id.  
132  Michael G. Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law of 
Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 129 (2013). 
133  Id. (citing Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the 
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985)).  
134  GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2, at 510–11 (1978). 
135  People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 30 (Ill. 1974); Heyman, supra note 127, at 397 
(describing Kessler as a case of the man in the “wrong place at the wrong time” who was 
convicted of two counts of attempted murder); People v. Williams, 64 N.E.3d 1086, 1100 at ¶ 
62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (Hyman, J., concurring) (holding that an individual need not even 
commit any crime at all to be convicted of another crime under accountability theory).  
136  Ill. P.A. 96–710, § 25 (effective Jan. 1, 2010).  
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not render a person accountable for an offense; a person’s presence at the scene of a 
crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when 
determining accountability.137 
A person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute defining the offense provides 
otherwise, if: 
(1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed; 
(2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct was inevitably incident to its 
commission; or 
(3) before the commission of the offense, he or she terminates his or her effort to 
promote or facilitate that commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly deprives 
his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that commission, (ii) gives timely warning to 
the proper law enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent 
the commission of the offense.138 
Accountability is not in and of itself a crime; rather, an accountability 
statute is a mechanism through which a criminal conviction may be 
reached.139  Under the Illinois statute and established through case law, the 
prosecution can establish a defendant’s intent by showing either that the 
defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal actor, or by showing that 
there was a common criminal design in which the defendant engaged.140  The 
Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Fernandez, clarified that the rule for 
common design remains that, “where one aids another in the planning or 
commission of an offense, he is legally accountable for the conduct of the 
person he aids[] and that the word ‘conduct’ encompasses any criminal act 
done in furtherance of the planned and intended act.”141  In Fernandez, the 
court compared accountability under common design to two prior cases: 
People v. Taylor and People v. Dennis.  In both cases, the defendant was the 
driver of a car whose passenger, unbeknownst to the defendant, intended to 
commit a crime.142  The Illinois Supreme Court classified these cases as 
belonging in the shared specific-intent category of accountability cases.  This 
meant that the defendant shared the intent of the passenger with the actual 
 
137  People v. Taylor, 646 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ill. 1995). 
138  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5–2 (West 2017).  
139  People v. Hicks, 693 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ill. 1998).  Person who commits offense under 
accountability principle can be charged and tried under indictment for substantive offense 
since accountability is not offense in itself but merely alternative to nature of proof required 
to convict for substantive offense.  People v. Buffington, 366 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); 
People v. Williams, 328 N.E.2d 682, 683–84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
140  People v. Fernandez, 6 N.E.3d 145, ¶ 13 at 149–50 (Ill. 2014) (citing In re W.C., 657 
N.E.2d 908 (Ill. 1995)).  
141  Id. 
142  People v. Taylor, 712 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 1999); People v. Dennis, 692 N.E.2d 325, 336 
(Ill. 1998). 
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intent to commit the crime.  Though the defendant did not know that any type 
of crime was going to be committed, the court used accountability theory to 
convict these defendants.143 
In Fenandez and other cases, the court has consistently held that mere 
presence at a crime scene is not enough to render a person accountable for 
the acts of another.144  However, Illinois courts have also held that active 
participation is unnecessary to impose guilt, and a defendant may aid and 
abet a crime without participating in the overt act.145  This, however, has 
created a gray area of what pushes a defendant beyond “mere presence.”146  
In an attempt to help clarify this, courts have enumerated six factors that may 
be considered in determining whether a person is accountable for the acts of 
the primary actor.  These factors are: (1) the defendant’s presence during the 
commission of the crime without any attempt to disassociate oneself from the 
crime, (2) acting as a lookout, (3) flight from the scene, (4) continued 
association with the perpetrator after the criminal act, (5) failure to report the 
incident, and (6) acceptance of illegal proceeds of the crime.147  While these 
factors, in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances, can be 
considered in determining accountability, none is dispositive.148  Beyond 
“mere presence” may also be proven by circumstantial evidence.  Thus, while 
direct evidence may be helpful, it is not necessary.149 
In September  2016, the Illinois Appellate Court solidified the expansive 
reach of the common design theory of accountability in People v. Williams.150  
In Williams, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Williams 
for first-degree murder through the accountability theory.151  Williams was 
with a number of other gang members when he participated in an altercation 
on a train platform with members of a rival gang.152  One member of the rival 
gang fell while running on the train tracks and died from electrocution.153  
The court determined that Williams could be found guilty through 
accountability by common design.154 The court reasoned that “by attaching 
 
143  Fernandez, 6 N.E.3d, at ¶ 21. 
144  Id. at ¶ 21; Dennis, 692 N.E.2d, at 336; Taylor, 646 N.E.2d at 57. 
145  Taylor, 712 N.E.2d, at 328–29. 
146  People v. McComb, 728 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
147  Id.  
148  Id.  
149  People v. Manley, 274 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971).  
150  People v. Williams, 64 N.E.3d 1086, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). 
151  Id. at 1100.   
152  Id. at 1088. 
153  Id. at 1089. 
154  Id. at 1098. 
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himself to a group bent on illegal action, defendant became accountable for 
all the crimes of his companions.”155  The court reasoned that proof of the 
common criminal design did not need to be supported by actual words of 
agreement, but could be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the act.156  Thus, Illinois accountability theory, through a 
common design premise, expanded with Williams to encompass “any acts in 
the furtherance of that common design” committed by any party that was 
privy to the original plan.157  In this way, the common design theory of 
accountability in Illinois provides an incredibly expansive mechanism for 
convicting offenders of criminal acts in which they did not partake and never 
intended to partake.158 
II.  ARGUING FOR A DIFFERENT JUVENILE STANDARD OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Within the eleven years since Roper was decided, scientific and 
psychological advancements in the understanding of the adolescent brain 
have been used to assist the Supreme Court in both instituting categorical 
bans on various sentences for juveniles and in establishing a new standard to 
analyze Miranda waivers that requires age to be a factor considered in the 
analysis.159  Through these landmark decisions, the Court has determined that 
the age of the accused, especially for young offenders, is essential to consider 
in two important stages of criminal procedure—interrogations and 
sentencing.160  While the Court has made explicit the need to consider age in 
these stages, the Court has yet to address the consideration of age in the guilt 
phase.161 
Justice Kennedy, using science and common sense, explained in Roper 
that “the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear 
when an individual turns 18.”162  Following Justice Kennedy’s determination, 
the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear the 
moment they walk into a courtroom.  The qualities that the Court has used to 
 
155  Id.  
156  Id. at 1096. 
157  Id. at 1098.  
158  See id.  
159  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–72 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 76 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
160  Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery all placed categorical bans on certain 
sentences based on youth while J.D.B. held that age is necessary for a proper Miranda analysis.  
161  For the purpose of this comment, I will be using “guilt phase” to refer to the phase 
beginning when a child is adjudicated for a specific crime and ending when he or she is 
determined guilty or innocent for said crime.  Essentially, “guilt phase” encompasses the 
determination of whether or not an alleged offender is or can be guilty of said crime.  
162  Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 
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dictate the treatment of juveniles during interrogation and during sentencing 
do not disappear during the guilt phase.  A juvenile’s age should continue to 
be used during the determination of his or her guilt and the culpability for the 
crime of which he or she has been accused. 
Accountability law, specifically in Illinois, fails to do this. Illinois 
accountability law views the decision to engage in any crime, misdemeanor 
or otherwise, as the only necessary element to support a conviction on 
accountability theory.163  Because accountability is derived from that first 
decision that a defendant makes to engage in a crime, it is important to assess 
the factors that go into that first decision.  And because the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged the factors that make adolescents categorically different 
from adults, these factors should also be used in the assessment of that first 
decision.  Therefore, analyzing accountability theory for juveniles should be 
categorically different than analyzing accountability theory for adults. 
The factors and characteristics of juveniles that the Court has both 
accepted and emphasized in their previous landmark decisions establish a 
new body of law.  By using this body of law to inform the analysis of 
accountability cases for juvenile offenders, it makes clear that accountability 
theory is unconstitutional when used to adjudicate juveniles.  Accountability 
theory in Illinois, specifically the common design theory, holds every 
individual who engages in one single illegal act accountable for all illegal 
acts that result as a consequence, even if the consequences vary greatly from 
the initial act.164  Individuals convicted under accountability theory are 
treated identically as the individuals who were the primary actors in the 
crime, regardless of the level of participation or the intent of the supporting 
actors.165  While other states still maintain the term “accessory,” allowing for 
various options to convict individuals as “accessory before the fact” or 
“accessory after the fact,” and thus opening the door for different levels of 
culpability in accountability cases, Illinois has no such options.166  All 
individuals convicted under accountability theory face the same 
consequences regardless of their degree of participation.167 
The common design theory then expands this to disregard not only 
 
163  “When two or more persons join together to commit an offense, even ‘a minor offense 
which involves violence,’ the parties are responsible for ‘everything’ that occurs as a result of 
the agreement.” People v. Williams, 64 N.E.3d 1086, 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). 
164  Id.  
165  Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: 
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 97 (1985).  
166  1–3 Ill. Crim. Law § 3.03 (2015).  
167  Id.; Michael G. Heyman, Due Process Limits on Accomplice Liability, 99 MINN. L. 
REV. HEADNOTES 131, 132 (2015).  
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degree of participation but also to disregard the intent of the actor to commit 
the charged crime.168  It is the common design theory of accountability that 
holds individuals vicariously liable for the actions of another.169  A century 
ago, this particular mechanism of deriving guilt was used to hold those 
accountable in instances such as a tavern owner whose employee sells liquor 
to a minor.170  While that conviction would still stand today, the more 
contemporary cases of common design accountability theory have been used 
for sweeping convictions of members of gangs who were either at the scene 
of a crime committed by their gang member or have involved themselves in 
some capacity in a criminal act.171  Again, this common design theory of 
accountability is based on the very first decision made by a defendant.  It may 
be a decision to engage in a criminal act or it may be the decision to attach 
oneself “to a group bent on illegal acts.”172  Whatever that decision may be, 
or however minor the decision, the courts in Illinois have determined that the 
first decision made by an actor carries with it the responsibility of all 
subsequent decisions, creating accountability theory. 
For adult accountability convictions, this rationale makes sense.  Adults, 
with fully developed brains, have the ability to foresee the consequences of 
their actions or to understand that their actions, no matter how minor, have 
consequences that may even be unintended.173  Adults are capable of 
weighing the costs and benefits of a particular crime and can think 
realistically about the array of possibilities that attach themselves to a single 
crime.174  In doing so, reasonable adults are capable of anticipating that one 
crime can lead to a completely different crime.  Whether or not adults do 
actually consider the foreseeability of these potential crimes or go through 
the process of weighing costs and benefits is irrelevant; rather, it is their 
ability to consider such consequences that renders them guilty.175  This is 
because capacity is the driving force behind a guilty verdict in all crimes.176 
 
168  Id.  
169  Id. 
170  Id.  
171  People v. Williams, 64 N.E.3d 1086, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). 
172  Id. at 1097.  A group bent on illegal acts has been commonly used as a primary factor 
in convicting gang members in large groups from the act of one single individual.  
173  See Mesulam, supra note 48, at 47–48. 
174  Scott & Steinberg, supra note 55, at 812–13.  
175  The State must prove that “the accused had sufficient mentality to distinguish 
between right and wrong as to the particular act, and that he was capable of exercising 
the power to choose between the right and the wrong.”	  	  
People v. Munroe, 154 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. 1958).  
176  Id.  
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The decision-making abilities that exist in an adult brain and thereby 
weigh in favor of guilt in adult accountability cases are the same decision-
making abilities that are in developmental stages in the brains of adolescents.  
Adolescent brains simply have not developed to the point where adolescents 
are able to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions in the same way 
as adults.177  Because their decision-making process is simply incompatible 
with that of an adult, a theory of guilt justification, which relies so heavily on 
that decision-making process, is unjust when applied to juveniles.  If a 
juvenile does not have the capacity for such decision-making, then the 
juvenile should be held less culpable for the crimes that ensue as a result of 
such decisions.  This is particularly true in homicide cases, as the Court in 
Graham held that “when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender 
who did not kill . . . has twice diminished moral culpability” and as such, 
“defendants who do not . . . foresee that life will be taken are categorically 
less deserving of such punishments than are murderers.”178  Because the traits 
of juveniles that make them categorically different from adults exist for the 
entire duration of their time in a courtroom, Graham’s determination of 
diminished culpability should be extended from consideration of punishment 
to determining guilt. 
Some may argue that the punishment phase allows for this consideration 
of age, foreseeability, and decision-making and therefore provides juveniles 
with enough protection.  However, the only way to ensure that juveniles are 
protected from accountability law is to categorically shield juveniles from 
accountability theory as it currently exists in Illinois.  Accountability theory 
holds all actors as guilty as the individual who committed the act, which will 
have life-changing consequences to individuals.  In many cases, like that in 
People v. Williams, it takes merely an intent to commit some offense for 
individuals to be held accountable for first degree murder.179  Courts in 
Illinois have used this very mechanism to find juveniles guilty through 
accountability and in many cases, impose harsh punishments as a result.180 
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While Graham suggests that juveniles can be protected by more lenient 
punishments without necessarily altering the guilt phase, too many 
intangibles exist that can result in juveniles facing the same life-altering 
consequences.181  For starters, judicial discretion presents the opportunity for 
judges to punish juveniles to the same extent as adults.  Though this judicial 
power quite possibly could result in fairer treatment of juveniles, judicial 
discretion works both ways.  Judges may treat juveniles fairer.  However, 
judges may also treat juveniles the same as adults, delivering identical 
sentences.  In State v. Roby, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that 
juveniles could be sentenced to a period of incarceration that would deny 
possibility of parole only after evaluating the juvenile using the mitigating 
factors of youth.182  This is an instance where the judicial discretion rejected 
the understanding of juveniles and the intent behind this new body of law 
adopted in Miller. 
Even though judicial discretion could, in some circumstances, alleviate 
the sting of the sentencing that accompanies convictions under accountability 
theory, sentencing guidelines make it impossible for judges to entirely erase 
the impact of accountability theory on a juvenile.183  In People v. Miller, a 
fifteen-year-old gang member stood outside a home while his two fellow 
gang members searched the neighborhood for members of a rival gang.184  
After hearing gunshots, Miller ran to his girlfriend’s house. Miller was 
charged with two counts of first degree murder, transferred to adult court, 
and sentenced to fifty years.185  Though the judge’s hands were tied in the 
conviction stage, he was able to comment on the effects of accountability 
theory.  Judge Linn explained that he was “very concerned about what this 
meant . . . to society at large, to be part of a society where a fifteen-year-old 
child on a theory of accountability only, passive accountability, would suffer” 
because the child was only “passively acting as a look out for other people, 
never picked up a gun, never had much more than—perhaps a minute—to 
contemplate what this entire incident is about, and he is in the same situation 
as a serial killer . . . .”186  In this case, while judicial discretion was helpful, it 
also had its limitations.  The judge was required to follow the law of 
accountability and uphold the finding of guilt.187  It is for this reason, among 
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many others, that the Court in Graham v. Florida, determined a categorical 
ban was necessary for the protection of juveniles. The Court reasoned that “a 
categorical rule avoids the risk that, as a result of these difficulties, a court or 
jury will erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is sufficiently 
culpable,” and thus using their discretion, will instill upon a juvenile the same 
consequences as an adult.188 
The example in People v. Miller provides the exact rationale for 
implementing a categorical ban on convicting juveniles under accountability 
theory.  In Graham v. Florida, a categorical ban was appropriate “because 
this case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class 
of offenders who have committed a range of crimes, the appropriate analysis 
is the categorical approach used in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy.”189  
Accountability theory also utilizes a particular method of conviction that 
implicates individuals who have committed a wide variety of crimes and just 
as in Graham, this ban should apply to an entire class of offenders—
juveniles. 
There are certainly concerns that derive from any categorical ban.  In 
Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy acknowledged, “[d]rawing the line at 18 
years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against 
categorical rules.”190  This is because it is difficult to draw a line in the sand 
because “the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear 
when an individual turns 18” and “[b]y the same token, some under 18 have 
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”191 Even 
with that concern however, the Court in Roper determined that the stark 
differences between juveniles and adults are so pronounced and have such 
overarching effects into the criminal justice system that “a line must be 
drawn.”192  More good is served by shielding the vast majority of adolescents 
from the sharp and irreparable sting of accountability theory than harm done 
by the miniscule number of adolescents that present those traits of an adult.  
The categorical approach was necessary in Graham, just like it is necessary 
in all accountability cases because “it does not follow that courts taking a 
case-by-case proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy 
distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have 
the capacity for change.”193  Following this logic, it is more appropriate to 
implement a categorical rule protecting juveniles than to allow courts 
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discretion to consider the facts of a case and a juvenile offender individually.  
This stance is congruent with numerous societal standards beyond the 
criminal justice system. Though society recognizes that not all adolescents 
mature and develop at the same rate, certain rules are uniformly applied to 
every adolescents.194 
A categorical ban also increases efficiency and decreases the chance for 
error on the part of the Court.  Accountability theory includes a vast array of 
factors that a court can choose to evaluate or ignore.  Used in determining 
guilt, these factors range from fleeing the scene, to continuing to associate 
with the individuals involved, to acting as a lookout.  Beyond these tangible 
factors, courts are free to interpret from the circumstances whether or not an 
individual is guilty under accountability theory.  This, in turn, gives the court 
a great deal of discretion and becomes the basis of many appeals.  Eliminating 
accountability theory for juveniles would save both time and resources in the 
courts, avoiding costly and time-consuming litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Simply put, juveniles are different from adults.  This concept was a 
cornerstone of American common law and more recently has been the focus 
of a great deal of Supreme Court jurisprudence.  These distinctions have built 
an entire criminal system solely for juveniles and have restricted juveniles 
from a myriad of privileges conferred upon adults⎯voting, drinking, serving 
in the military.  In the past decade, landmark decisions have been handed 
down by the Supreme Court solidifying the legal importance of these 
distinctions.  In sum, the Supreme Court has determined that juveniles are 
categorically different from adults, and the law must acknowledge that stark 
dissimilarity.  Because juveniles are now provided protection from the death 
penalty, life without parole, and an age-inclusive Miranda analysis, it is vital 
to examine the Court’s logic.  Doing so leads one to an understanding that 
these differences between juveniles and adults do not dissipate during the 
conviction stage.  In accountability cases, where the law seems as far 
reaching and all-encompassing as it could possibly be, it is vital for courts to 
utilize the same logic and body of law that has structured Miller, Roper, 
Graham, and J.D.B.  This body of law will lead to only one just conclusion—
the justifications for imposing accountability theory simply do not exist for 
juveniles due to the psychological factors that render them poor decision 
makers, easily influenced, and near-sighted.  For this reason, accountability 
theory is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles and should be categorically 
abolished. 
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